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Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission

University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 2010

William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-19

30 Pages Posted: 13 Dec 2009  

Jayne W. Barnard

William & Mary Law School

Date Written: December 8, 2009

Abstract

Since the worldwide financial meltdown in the autumn of 2008 and the discovery of Bernard Madoff’s crimes in December, 2008, hundreds of critics and political leaders have heaped abuse upon the SEC Enforcement Division. This article explores the SEC’s response to these critics, primarily through the appointment of new top-level managers and the initiation of an aggressive reorganization of the processes and workflow of the Division. It then sketches out six recommendations for further improving the Enforcement Division: a bounty program to compensate informants who come forward with useful information; creation of a victim services unit; a proposal to develop behavioral, as well as legal and financial, expertise within the Division; a surveillance and monitoring program for defendants demonstrating a recidivist profile; a sanction policy for individuals that is proportionate, progressive, remedial, and real; and regular publication of meaningful data regarding losses from fraud in the securities markets.

Keywords: securities and exchange commission, enforcement, fraud, bounty, victim

Suggested Citation

Barnard, Jayne W., Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (December 8, 2009). University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 2010; William & Mary Law School Research Paper No. 09-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1520697

Jayne W. Barnard (Contact Author)

William & Mary Law School ( email )

South Henry Street
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
United States
(757) 221-3849 (Phone)
(757) 221-3261 (Fax)

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