Pensions as Psychological Contracts: Implications for Work Outcomes

22 Pages Posted: 15 Dec 2009

See all articles by Andrew A. Luchak

Andrew A. Luchak

University of Alberta - Department of Strategic Management and Organization

Dionne Pohler

University of Toronto

Abstract

Drawing on psychological contract theory, we develop predictions regarding the moderating influence of the meaning employees assign to their marginal quit costs, as well as on the role of stayer perceptions and saver effects, on various work outcomes under a defined-benefit pension. Results show pension incentives can have favorable or unfavorable effects depending on whether employees perceive them as supportive relational contracts or as low-trust transactional contracts. Implications for research and policy are discussed.

Suggested Citation

Luchak, Andrew A. and Pohler, Dionne, Pensions as Psychological Contracts: Implications for Work Outcomes. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 49, Issue 1, pp. 61-82, January 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1521259 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2009.00587.x

Andrew A. Luchak (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Strategic Management and Organization ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada

Dionne Pohler

University of Toronto ( email )

121 St. George St.
Toronto, ON M5S 2E8
Canada

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