The Strategic Use of Economic Models in a Macro Game

New Zealand Economic Papers, Vol. 25, June 1991

Posted: 14 Dec 2009

See all articles by Paul Tompkinson

Paul Tompkinson

Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance

Date Written: 1991

Abstract

This paper develops a macro game with a government and a union as players. The game consists of the players selecting from amongst a set of competitive reduced forms. The selected forms in conjunction with the true model determine the non-cooperative equilibrium values of the endogenous variables. The main conclusion to emerge is that the players may select different models even if their beliefs as to which is the true model are identical.

Keywords: Macro game, government, union, non-cooperative equilibrium, models

JEL Classification: F41, C70, E10

Suggested Citation

Tompkinson, Paul, The Strategic Use of Economic Models in a Macro Game (1991). New Zealand Economic Papers, Vol. 25, June 1991, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1521839

Paul Tompkinson (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - School of Economics & Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington 6140
New Zealand

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