Spend More, Get More? An Inquiry into English Local Government Performance

Posted: 22 Dec 2009

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2010

Abstract

Based on a unique measure of performance of English local governments in the provision of public services (Comprehensive Performance Assessment, CPA), this paper uses panel data (2002-7) to identify the determinants of performance. In particular, by thoroughly exploiting the features of the British system of local government finance and the mandatory nature of decentralized public service provision, this paper aims at investigating the impact of government spending on public service outcomes. Due to the nature of CPA ratings-measured on a five category (poor to excellent) scale-the empirical work relies on an ordered response approach allowing for cross-sectional heterogeneity. The empirical evidence suggests that local public expenditures in excess of centrally set spending standards have a detrimental effect on performance.

JEL Classification: C23, C25, H72

Suggested Citation

Revelli, Federico, Spend More, Get More? An Inquiry into English Local Government Performance (January 2010). Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 62, Issue 1, pp. 185-207, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1525255 or http://dx.doi.org/gpp037

Federico Revelli (Contact Author)

University of Turin ( email )

Via Po 53
Facolta di Scienze Politiche
10124 Torino
Italy

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