EU Federalism and the Governance of Financial Reporting

Posted: 22 Dec 2009

See all articles by Jochen Zimmermann

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control

Abstract

The European Union (EU) is built on the federalist principle of subsidiarity, which we consider in the policy field of financial reporting. We attempt to answer the question, whether the current accounting regulation in Europe is sensibly balanced between centralized and decentralized decision making. Drawing on comparative accounting research to identify criteria for “local preferences,” we conclude that local solutions currently remain preferable for small and medium-sized companies. For them, a centralized solution would result in additional costs for at least some member states and their residents. Large international firms, in contrast, face an increasingly integrated capital market and rather need a central solution as currently implemented by the EU. However, recent developments in corporate finance may align local preferences on accountancy in the future.

Suggested Citation

Zimmermann, Jochen, EU Federalism and the Governance of Financial Reporting. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 200-225, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1525321 or http://dx.doi.org/pjp025

Jochen Zimmermann (Contact Author)

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )

Universitaetsallee GW I
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
858
PlumX Metrics