Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

46 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2009 Last revised: 13 Feb 2023

See all articles by Petra Moser

Petra Moser

NYU Stern Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alessandra Voena

Stanford University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

Suggested Citation

Moser, Petra and Voena, Alessandra, Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act (December 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15598, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1525776

Petra Moser (Contact Author)

NYU Stern Department of Economics ( email )

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New York, NY 10003
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Alessandra Voena

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States