Seeking Similarity: How Immigrants and Natives Manage at the Labor Market

43 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2009 Last revised: 8 May 2025

See all articles by Olof Aslund

Olof Aslund

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Lena Hensvik

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation

Oskar Nordstrom Skans

Uppsala University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

We show that immigrant managers are substantially more likely to hire immigrants than are native managers. The finding holds when comparing establishments in the same 5-digit industry and location, when comparing different establishments within the same firm, when analyzing establishments that change management over time, and when accounting for within-establishment trends in recruitment patterns. The effects are largest for small and owner-managed establishments in the for-profit sector. Separations are more frequent when workers and managers have dissimilar origin, but only before workers become protected by EPL. We also find that native managers are unbiased in their recruitments of former co-workers, suggesting that information deficiencies are important. We find no effects on entry wages. Our findings suggest that a low frequency of immigrant managers may contribute to the observed disadvantages of immigrant workers.

Keywords: workplace segregation, labor mobility, minority workers

JEL Classification: J15, J21, J62, M51

Suggested Citation

Aslund, Olof and Hensvik, Lena and Nordström Skans, Oskar, Seeking Similarity: How Immigrants and Natives Manage at the Labor Market. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4640, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1526070

Olof Aslund (Contact Author)

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation ( email )

Box 513
751 20 Uppsala
Sweden
+46 18 471 70 89 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Lena Hensvik

IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation ( email )

Box 513
751 20 Uppsala
Sweden

Oskar Nordström Skans

Uppsala University ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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