Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas

40 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2009

See all articles by Özgür Gürerk

Özgür Gürerk

University of Erfurt - Economics, Law, and Social Sciences

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Bettina Rockenbach

University of Cologne

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

Economic and social interactions often take place in open communities but the dynamics of the community choice process and its impact on cooperation of its members are yet not well understood. We experimentally investigate community choice in social dilemmas. Participants repeatedly choose between a community with and an alternative without punishment opportunities. Within each community a social dilemma game is played. While the community with punishment grows over time and fully cooperates, the alternative becomes depopulated. We analyze the success of this "voting with feet" mechanism and find that endogenous self-selection is key while slow growth is less decisive.

Keywords: cooperation, social dilemmas, community choice, punishment, voting with feet

JEL Classification: C72, C92, H41

Suggested Citation

Gürerk, Özgür and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Rockenbach, Bettina, Voting with Feet: Community Choice in Social Dilemmas (December 2009). IZA Discussion Paper No. 4643, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1526073

Özgür Gürerk (Contact Author)

University of Erfurt - Economics, Law, and Social Sciences ( email )

Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7955 7840 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Bettina Rockenbach

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
++49 470 8664 (Phone)
++49 470 8668 (Fax)

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