Who Gets the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick? Evidence of Gender Disparities in Executive Remuneration

Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2011). Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 301-321.

54 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2009 Last revised: 24 Aug 2012

See all articles by Clara Kulich

Clara Kulich

University of Geneva; University of Exeter

Grzegorz Trojanowski

University of Exeter

Michelle K. Ryan

University of Exeter - School of Psychology

S. Alexander Haslam

University of Exeter - School of Psychology

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context-specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.-listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance-sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy-related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations’ indifference to women’s performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent.

Keywords: executive compensation, gender pay gap, gender stereotypes, implicit leadership theories, corporate performance, romance of leadership

JEL Classification: J31, J33, M52, G30

Suggested Citation

Kulich, Clara and Trojanowski, Grzegorz and Ryan, Michelle K. and Haslam, S. Alexander and Renneboog, Luc, Who Gets the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick? Evidence of Gender Disparities in Executive Remuneration (2011). Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2011). Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration. Strategic Management Journal, 32, 301-321., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1526948 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1526948

TILEC (Tilburg Law & Economic) Submitter (Contact Author)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Clara Kulich

University of Geneva ( email )

Uni Mail - 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve
Genève, Genève CH-1205
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.unige.ch/fapse/psychosociale/collaborateurs/Kulich/kulichpubli.html

University of Exeter ( email )

Northcote House
The Queen's Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4QJ
United Kingdom

Grzegorz Trojanowski

University of Exeter ( email )

Streatham Court
Rennes Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4PU
United Kingdom

Michelle K. Ryan

University of Exeter - School of Psychology ( email )

Exeter EX4 4QX, Devon
United Kingdom

S. Alexander Haslam

University of Exeter - School of Psychology ( email )

Exeter EX4 4QX, Devon
United Kingdom

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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