Why do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?

58 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2009

See all articles by Craig Doidge

Craig Doidge

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

George Andrew Karolyi

Cornell University - SC Johnson College of Business

René M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 9, 2010

Abstract

Foreign firms terminate their SEC registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms' insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock-price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h-6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock-price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h-6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.

Keywords: corporate governance, SOX, deregistration, Exchange Act Rule, bonding theory, loss of competitiveness theory

JEL Classification: G15, G18, G32, G34, G38, F30

Suggested Citation

Doidge, Craig and Karolyi, George Andrew and Stulz, Rene M., Why do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets? (January 9, 2010). Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-003, Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2009-3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1527190

Craig Doidge

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-8598 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Doidge

George Andrew Karolyi

Cornell University - SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

174A STATLER HALL
ITHACA, NY 14853
United States
6142820229 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.johnson.cornell.edu/faculty-research/faculty/gak56/

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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