TARP’s Deadbeat Banks

50 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2009 Last revised: 19 Sep 2012

Linus Wilson

University of Louisiana at Lafayette - College of Business Administration

Date Written: September 18, 2012

Abstract

This paper tests whether poorly capitalized banks with troubled loan books are more likely to miss their bailout dividends. Privately held banks with weaker core capital ratios, more charged off loans, more allowances for loan losses, and more non-performing loans are more likely to miss their Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) dividends. Banks that issue non-cumulative preferred stock are also more likely to be TARP deadbeats. In addition, banks that missed a bailout dividend in the prior quarter are significantly more likely to miss the next bailout dividend.

Keywords: bailout, banking, debt overhang, Capital Purchase Program, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, lending, preferred stock, subordinated debt, TARP

JEL Classification: G21, G28, G38

Suggested Citation

Wilson, Linus, TARP’s Deadbeat Banks (September 18, 2012). Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1527270 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1527270

Linus Wilson (Contact Author)

University of Louisiana at Lafayette - College of Business Administration ( email )

Department of Economics & Finance
214 Hebrard Blvd., Room 326
Lafayette, LA 70504-0200
United States
(337) 482-6209 (Phone)
(337) 482-6675 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.linuswilson.com

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