Railway (De)Regulation: A European Efficiency Comparison

15 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2009

See all articles by Guido Friebel

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Catherine Vibes

University of Toulouse 1 - Centre Interuniversitaire de Calcul de Toulouse (CICT)

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Abstract

We estimate the effects of reforms on railroad efficiency in Europe by using a new panel data set that covers most EU countries over a period of more than 20 years. A production frontier model finds that efficiency increases when reforms such as third-party network access, introduction of an independent regulator, and vertical separation are implemented. However, the reform effects depend on sequencing: introduction of multiple reforms in a package has negative effects, while sequential reforms improve efficiency. We also show that our results are robust against potential problems of endogeneity.

Suggested Citation

Friebel, Guido and Ivaldi, Marc and Vibes, Catherine, Railway (De)Regulation: A European Efficiency Comparison. Economica, Vol. 77, Issue 305, pp. 77-91, January 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1527607 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2008.00739.x

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Marc Ivaldi

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France
+33 5 61 12 8592 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Catherine Vibes

University of Toulouse 1 - Centre Interuniversitaire de Calcul de Toulouse (CICT) ( email )

118, route de Narbonne
Toulouse Cedex 4, F-31062
France

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