Who Cuts Back and When? The Politics of Delays in Social Expenditure Cutbacks, 1980-2005

Abstract

This article investigates the politics of delays in social spending cutbacks in OECD democracies. In the context of fiscal austerity, policymakers are assumed to have a strong incentive to manipulate the timing of cutbacks strategically. Applying event history analysis to small and large cutbacks in 21 mature welfare states, we test whether partisanship, electioneering, and institutional constraints contribute to explain the timing of cutbacks. Macro-economic determinants such as worker productivity, economic growth and unemployment are found to be more important than these political variables. However, leftwing governments and welfare states with more institutional rigidity or a larger degree of contribution financing do tend to delay welfare cutbacks, while cabinets that have recently changed their party composition implement cutbacks earlier.

Keywords: event history analysis, blame avoidance, electioneering, partisanship, retrenchment, veto players