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Land Rights Insecurity and Temporary Migration in Rural China

47 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2010  

Maëlys de la Rupelle

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Quheng Deng

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Li Shi

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Institute of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Thomas Vendryes

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Abstract

Like most other developing countries, China experiences huge migration outflows from rural areas. Their most striking characteristic is a high geographical and temporal mobility. Rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin villages and destination areas. In this paper, we show that this temporary feature of migration can be linked to land rights insecurity. As village land ownership remains collective and as land use rights can be periodically reallocated, individual out-migration can result in deprivation of those rights. Moreover, the intensity of this insecurity varies according to the village-level management of land and the contractual status of land plots. We use these variations to identify the effect of land rights insecurity on migration behavior. Empirical results based on representative 2002 rural data demonstrate substantial impact.

Keywords: migration, land rights insecurity, China, semiparametric censored regression models

JEL Classification: C34, J61, 015, P32, Q15

Suggested Citation

de la Rupelle, Maëlys and Deng, Quheng and Shi, Li and Vendryes, Thomas, Land Rights Insecurity and Temporary Migration in Rural China. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4668. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1530672

Maëlys De la Rupelle (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Deng Quheng

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) ( email )

Beijing, 100732
China

Li Shi

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) - Institute of Economics ( email )

2 Yuetan Beixiaojie
Beijing
+86 1 068032473 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Thomas Vendryes

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

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