Destination Management and Tourists' Choice with a Two-Part Tariff Price of the Holiday

Rivista di Politica Economica, Forthcoming

20 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2010 Last revised: 23 Apr 2010

See all articles by Guido Candela

Guido Candela

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Paolo Figini

University of Bologna - Department of Economics; University of Bologna - CAST - Centre for Advanced Studies in Tourism

Antonello E. Scorcu

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 5, 2009

Abstract

The holiday can be considered a good for which the tourist pays a two-part tariff (TPT). The variable part, roughly proportional to the length of stay, is charged on top of a fixed price, paid to get to the destination (typically due to travel costs). We analyse the policy implications of this price structure in both monopoly and monopolistic competition, by arguing that the TPT might be used as a policy instrument to drive the tourist towards certain destination targets in terms of arrivals and length of stay, thus possibly contrasting the present trend in the reduction of holidays’ length.

Keywords: Two-part tariff; pricing strategy, tourism economics, tourism destination

JEL Classification: L1, L83, R3, R5

Suggested Citation

Candela, Guido and Figini, Paolo and Scorcu, Antonello, Destination Management and Tourists' Choice with a Two-Part Tariff Price of the Holiday (October 5, 2009). Rivista di Politica Economica, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1531590

Guido Candela

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 0541 434118-9 (Phone)
+39 0541 434120 (Fax)

Paolo Figini (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40126
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/dsa/profile.php?id=33

University of Bologna - CAST - Centre for Advanced Studies in Tourism ( email )

Via AngherĂ  22
Rimini, RN 47922
Italy

Antonello Scorcu

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

I-40126 Bologna
Italy

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