Rationalizable Implementation

30 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2010

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

MIT

Olivier Tercieux

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 5, 2010

Abstract

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also sufficient under a mild "no worst alternative" condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We also discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.

Keywords: Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

JEL Classification: C79, D82

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward and Tercieux, Olivier, Rationalizable Implementation (January 5, 2010). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1531738 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1531738

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

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Stephen Edward Morris

MIT ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

Olivier Tercieux

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE) ( email )

48, BD Jourdan
75014 Paris
France

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