Efficiency of Financial Transmission Rights Markets in Centrally Coordinated Periodic Auctions
18 Pages Posted: 5 Jan 2010 Last revised: 6 Sep 2012
Date Written: March 15, 2010
Electricity market design in the United States is increasingly dominated by locational marginal pricing (LMP) of energy and transmission. LMP markets are typically coupled with periodic auctions of financial transmission rights (FTRs) to hedge transmission price risks. While LMP designs offer considerable advantages, forward price discovery in these markets requires participants to form efficient expectations on spot congestion price differences. In this paper, we examine trends in the efficiency of one of the early LMP markets, the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO), analyzing a panel data set of over 9000 contracts over a six-year period beginning September 2000. We show that NYISO FTR markets were inefficient in their early years, but that market participants learned to predict forward prices and thus efficiency improved for FTRs not solely within the New York City/Long Island sub-region. FTRs within this sub-region, which has a number of special characteristics, remain relatively inefficient.
Keywords: Electricity markets, locational marginal pricing, financial transmission rights, market learning, transmission congestion contracts
JEL Classification: G12, G14, P41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation