Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, No.2, pp. 316-328, January 2001

Posted: 6 Jan 2010

See all articles by Orley Ashenfelter

Orley Ashenfelter

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Dean Hyslop

Motu Economic and Public Policy Research

Date Written: January 5, 2010

Abstract

In this paper we provide an empirical evaluation of the effect that the provision of an arbitration statute has on the wage levels of police officers. We analyze the effect of arbitration on wages by comparing wage levels across political jurisdictions and over time using a sample of states. Two complementary data sources are used: panel data on state level wages of police officers, and individual level data on police officers from Decennial Censuses. The empirical results from both data sets are remarkably consistent and provide no robust evidence that the presence of arbitration statues has a consistent effect on overall wage levels. On average, the effect of arbitration is approximately zero, although there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effects across states.

Keywords: Empirical analysis, Wage levels, Police officers, Arbitration, Robust evidence

JEL Classification: C01, J31, J52

Suggested Citation

Ashenfelter, Orley C. and Hyslop, Dean R., Measuring the Effect of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers (January 5, 2010). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, No.2, pp. 316-328, January 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1531970

Orley C. Ashenfelter

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
United States
609-258-4040 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Dean R. Hyslop (Contact Author)

Motu Economic and Public Policy Research ( email )

Level 1, 93 Cuba Street
P.O. Box 24390
Wellington, 6142
New Zealand

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