Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment

36 Pages Posted: 8 Jan 2010

See all articles by Andreas Nicklisch

Andreas Nicklisch

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Irenaeus Wolff

University of Konstanz - TWI; CEREB

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

Carpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and self-contained episodes of interaction, we disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides data on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Our results partly confirm the findings of Carpenter and Matthews: only for the punishment-related decisions in the first iteration is the absolute norm outperformed by the self-referential norm set by the punisher's own contribution. For the decisions in all later iterations, as well as for bystanders' support in all iterations, the absolute norm organizes our data best. In contrast to the study by Carpenter and Matthews, we find an absolute norm of 3=4 of players' endowments to be both consistent across decisions and relatively stable over time.

Keywords: experiment, public-good punishment, Social Norms, voluntary cooperation

JEL Classification: C92, D63, H41

Suggested Citation

Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus, Cooperation Norms in Multiple-Stage Punishment (December 2009). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/40. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532111

Andreas Nicklisch (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - School of Business, Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

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Germany

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

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Germany
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Irenaeus Wolff

University of Konstanz - TWI ( email )

Fach D-144
Universit├Ątsstra├če 10
Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

CEREB ( email )

Internationales Buro
Nordhaeuser Str. 63
D - 99089 Erfurt
Germany

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