Climate Change Mitigation Options and Directed Technical Change: A Decentralized Equilibrium Analysis

43 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2010

See all articles by Andre Grimaud

Andre Grimaud

GREMAQ, IDEI and LEERNA - University of Toulouse 1

Gilles Lafforgue

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Bertrand Magne

University of Toulouse I

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

The paper considers a climate change growth model with three R&D sectors dedicated to energy, backstop and CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) efficiency. First, we characterize the set of decentralized equilibria: A particular equilibrium is associated to each vector of public tools which includes a carbon tax and a subsidy to each R&D sector. Moreover, we show that it is possible to compute any equilibrium as the solution of a maximization program. Second, we solve the first-best optimum problem and we implement it by computing the vector of optimal tools. Finally, we illustrate the theoretical model using some calibrated functional specifications. In particular, we investigate the effects of various combinations of public policies (including the optimal ones) by determining the deviation of each corresponding equilibrium from the "laisser-faire" benchmark.

Keywords: climate change, energy, CCS, directed technical change, carbon tax, R&D subsidies

JEL Classification: H23, O32, Q43, Q54, Q55

Suggested Citation

Grimaud, Andre and Lafforgue, Gilles and Magne, Bertrand, Climate Change Mitigation Options and Directed Technical Change: A Decentralized Equilibrium Analysis (December 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2875, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532663 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532663

Andre Grimaud

GREMAQ, IDEI and LEERNA - University of Toulouse 1 ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 561 12 86 04 (Phone)
+33 561 12 86 37 (Fax)

Gilles Lafforgue (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Bertrand Magne

University of Toulouse I ( email )

Place Anatole France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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