Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion

39 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2010

See all articles by Chiara Fumagalli

Chiara Fumagalli

Bocconi University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Massimo Motta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Thomas Rønde

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 7, 2010

Abstract

This paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.

Keywords: Monopolization Practices, Vertical Agreements

JEL Classification: L12, L4, L42

Suggested Citation

Fumagalli, Chiara and Motta, Massimo and Rønde, Thomas, Exclusive Dealing: The Interaction between Foreclosure and Investment Promotion (January 7, 2010). FEEM Working Paper No. 120.2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532750 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1532750

Chiara Fumagalli (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy
+39 02 5836 5311 (Phone)
+39 02 5836 5318 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Massimo Motta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Thomas Rønde

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Øster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+64 9 532 3014 (Phone)
+64 9 532 3000 (Fax)

Center for Economic and Business Research (CEBR) ( email )

Porcelaenshaven, Bldg 65
DK-2000 Frederiksberg
Denmark

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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