'The Law, and Not Conscience, Constitutes the Rule of Action': The South Bend Fugitive Slave Case and the Value of 'Justice Delayed'

THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITIAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY EXPERIENCE, Donald G. Nieman, ed., pp. 23-51, University of Georgia Press, 1992

29 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2010  

Paul Finkelman

University of Pittsburgh, School of Law; Albany Law School - Government Law Center

Date Written: 1992

Abstract

In this article, Professor Finkelman discusses the South Bend Fugitive Slave case, an unusual example of northern resistance to the return of fugitive slaves: the slaves were peacefully released by a state judge after two hearings into their status rather than a dramatic rescue as there was in other cases of the day. However, Finkelman suggests that the case provides a useful framework for examining a variety of antebellum legal and social issues.

Suggested Citation

Finkelman, Paul, 'The Law, and Not Conscience, Constitutes the Rule of Action': The South Bend Fugitive Slave Case and the Value of 'Justice Delayed' (1992). THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITIAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY EXPERIENCE, Donald G. Nieman, ed., pp. 23-51, University of Georgia Press, 1992. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1533497

Paul Finkelman (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh, School of Law ( email )

3900 Forbes Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States
412-648-2079 (Phone)

Albany Law School - Government Law Center ( email )

80 New Scotland Avenue
Albany, NY 12208
United States

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