Quality Provision, Expected Firm Altruism and Brand Extensions

41 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2010 Last revised: 21 Sep 2024

See all articles by Julio J. Rotemberg

Julio J. Rotemberg

Harvard University, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit (deceased); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (deceased)

Date Written: January 2010

Abstract

This paper studies quality choice in a model where consumers expect firms (or brands) to act altruistically. Under plausible assumptions regarding this altruism and the reaction of consumers to firms that demonstrate insufficient altruism, existing brands can face a larger demand for new products than new entrants. Moreover, the failure of new products can reduce the demand for a brand's existing products even if the quality of these existing products is well understood by consumers. The model provides an interpretation for the dependence of the success of brand extensions on the ``fit" between the original product and the extension. The model can also explain why a ``high-end" brand that is expected to care only for its most quality sensitive customers can have an advantage in introducing a product relative to a brand that is expected to be more widely altruistic.

Suggested Citation

Rotemberg, Julio J., Quality Provision, Expected Firm Altruism and Brand Extensions (January 2010). NBER Working Paper No. w15635, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1533669

Julio J. Rotemberg (Contact Author)

Harvard University, Business, Government and the International Economy Unit (deceased) ( email )

Cambridge, MA
United States
617-495-1015 (Phone)
617-496-5994 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (deceased)

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United States

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