Negative-Expected-Value Suits

PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Chris Sanchirico, ed., 2011

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 656

12 Pages Posted: 12 Jan 2010 Last revised: 11 Jun 2014

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alon Klement

Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

We review the literature on negative-expected-value suits (NEV suits) – suits in which the plaintiff would obtain a negative expected return from pursuing the suit all the way to judgment. We discuss alternative theories as to why, and when, plaintiffs with NEV suits can extract a positive settlement amount. In particular, we explain how such a plaintiff can extract a positive settlement due (i) asymmetry of information between the parties, (ii) divisibility of the plaintiff's litigation costs, (iii) upfront costs that the defendant must incur before the plaintiff incurs any costs; (iv) expectation that the arrival of information during the course of the litigation may turn the suit into a positive-expected-value one, (5) reputation that enables the plaintiff to bind itself to going to trial if the defendant refuses to settle; or (6) the plaintiff’s having a contingency fee or retainer arrangement with its lawyer.

Keywords: Litigation, settlement, frivolous suits, negative expected value suits, positive expected value suit, divisibility, credibility, fee-shifting, contingent fees, retainer

JEL Classification: K19, K41

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Klement, Alon, Negative-Expected-Value Suits (December 2009). PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Chris Sanchirico, ed., 2011; Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 656. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534703

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Alon Klement

Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University ( email )

Tel Aviv
Israel

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