Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

42 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2010

See all articles by Louis Putterman

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 12, 2010

Abstract

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.

Keywords: public good, voluntary contribution, formal sanction, experiment, penalty, voting

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D71, D72, H41

Suggested Citation

Putterman, Louis G. and Tyran, Jean-Robert and Kamei, Kenju, Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment (January 12, 2010). Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1535201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1535201

Louis G. Putterman (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Jean-Robert Tyran

University of Vienna ( email )

Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

HOME PAGE: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/jean-robert.tyran/

University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )

Ă˜ster Farimagsgade 5
Bygning 26
1353 Copenhagen K.
Denmark
+45 353 23 027 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.ku.dk/tyran/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

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