A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Corruption and Anti-Corruption

Revista de Economía Institucional, Vol. 11, No. 21, Second Semester 2009

28 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2010

See all articles by Frédéric Boehm

Frédéric Boehm

Universidad Autónoma del Caribe

Johann Graf Lambsdorff

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: December 1, 2009

Abstract

Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The aim of this article is to open the “black box” of corrupt transactions using the framework of the New Institutional Economics. First, it examines “corrupt contracts”, the institutions that promote them, the mechanisms involved, the transaction costs and the problems faced by the actors. Then the stages of a typical corrupt agreement are described: initiation, execution and post-contractual phase. To combat corruption the understanding of how corrupt actors think and how corrupt agreements work is necessary. Finally, the potential and limitations of traditional and the more recent anti-corruption measures are analyzed.

Note: Downloadable document is in Spanish.

Keywords: Corruption, institutions, transaction costs, anti-corruption

JEL Classification: B52, D73

Suggested Citation

Boehm, Frédéric and Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, A New Institutional Economics Perspective on Corruption and Anti-Corruption (December 1, 2009). Revista de Economía Institucional, Vol. 11, No. 21, Second Semester 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1535550

Frédéric Boehm (Contact Author)

Universidad Autónoma del Caribe ( email )

Street 90
Barranquilla
Colombia

Johann Graf Lambsdorff

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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