Why is this Taking so Long? The Move Towards a National Securities Regulator

University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 2010

28 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2010

See all articles by Anita Anand

Anita Anand

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Andrew James Green

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law

Date Written: January 13, 2010

Abstract

Game theoretical analysis can be useful in contexts such as securities regulation, where multiple decision makers (i.e. securities regulatory authorities or commissions) act unilaterally but can also potentially reap benefits from cooperation. We deploy several models in seeking to render more transparent the strategies and payoffs that motivate jurisdictions to support or resist the introduction of a national securities regulator for Canada. Our analysis suggests that consensus has not been reached regarding a national regulator not only because of a lack of cooperation but also because of a lack of coordination. Indeed, it seems plausible both that provinces recognize the benefit of adopting a common standardized regulatory model; and that the source of disagreement surrounds the precise regulatory content of that common standardized model. This paper explores the implications of this insight.

Suggested Citation

Anand, Anita and Green, Andrew James, Why is this Taking so Long? The Move Towards a National Securities Regulator (January 13, 2010). University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1536114 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1536114

Anita Anand (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

78 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
4169464002 (Phone)

Andrew James Green

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law ( email )

84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada

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