What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals

38 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2010 Last revised: 29 Jan 2010

See all articles by Stephen J. Choi

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: January 5, 2010

Abstract

We report evidence from a dataset of federal district judges from 2001 to 2002 that district judges adjust their opinion-writing practices to minimize their workload while maximizing their reputation and chance for elevation to a higher court. District judges in circuits with politically uniform circuit judges are better able to predict what opinions will get affirmed by the circuit court, leading to higher publication rates and a higher affirmance rate. In contrast, district judges in circuits with politically diverse circuit judges are less able to predict the preferences of the reviewing circuit court panel, leading district judges to publish fewer but higher quality opinions in an effort to maximize their affirmance rate.

Suggested Citation

Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu and Posner, Eric A., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals (January 5, 2010). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 508, NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1536723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1536723

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law ( email )

40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rb.gy/y6mrqu

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States

Eric A. Posner (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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