Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms

21 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2010

See all articles by Mike W. Peng

Mike W. Peng

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Yi Jiang

California State University, East Bay - School of Business & Economics

Abstract

There is a major debate regarding the role of concentrated family ownership and control in large firms, with three positions suggesting that such concentration is (1) good, (2) bad, or (3) irrelevant for firm value. Why are there such differences? We theorize that the impact of family ownership and control on firm value is associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied in legal and regulatory institutions of a country. Data from 634 publicly listed large family firms in seven Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) are used to test our hypotheses. Overall, this article sketches the contours of a cross-country, institution-based view of corporate governance, and leads to a more informed understanding of the crucial role of institutions behind family ownership and control in large firms.

Suggested Citation

Peng, Mike W. and Jiang, Yi, Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 253-273, March 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1537414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00890.x

Mike W. Peng (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

Yi Jiang

California State University, East Bay - School of Business & Economics ( email )

25800 Carlos Bee Boulevard
Hayward, CA 94542
United States

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