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Advertising, Product Differentiation and Cooperation

Moshe Bar-Niv (Burnovski)

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law

Israel Zang

affiliation not provided to SSRN

January 17, 2010

Collaboration among sizeable competitors is usually considered to be harmful to social welfare while competition among such competitors is perceived the better, or even best, mode of operation. We examine industries where the goods produced are homogeneous and producers employ advertising in order to artificially differentiate the products in the eyes of customers. Our two stage game models consider firms that advertise in the first stage and then compete, in the second stage, in the final products market. We explore the effects of either a no-advertising regime, a competition regime, or a cooperation regime in the advertising stage. We examine the consumer and producer welfare effects of the above regimes, and show that cooperative advertising dominates competitive advertising as both customers and producers would prefer cooperation over competition. Indeed, cooperative advertising yields higher profits, lower prices and less wasteful advertising. Hence, forbidding cooperation (cartel) in the advertising phase, as an antitrust violation, is erroneous, and the regulator should rather allow and even encourage such cooperation. Similarly, courts, while dealing with such advertising collaboration, should interpret the rule of reason in a manner that defines it within the legitimate range of economic behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Antitrust law, competition, cartels, advertising, regulation, oliglopol

JEL Classification: C71, D43, M37

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Date posted: January 18, 2010 ; Last revised: January 28, 2010

Suggested Citation

Bar-Niv (Burnovski), Moshe and Zang, Israel, Advertising, Product Differentiation and Cooperation (January 17, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1537785 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1537785

Contact Information

Moshe Bar-Niv (Contact Author)
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
+972-9-952-7220 (Phone)
+972-9-951-3075 (Fax)
Israel Zang
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Feedback to SSRN

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