Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate

10 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2010  

Joseph Grundfest

Stanford University Law School

Date Written: January 18, 2010

Abstract

Recent empirical data indicate that the Commission’s proxy access proposals reduce shareholder wealth and are inimical to the best interests of the shareholder community at large. Cross-sectional variation in stock price response data further suggest that the Commission should reject a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, and that an opt-in rule is less likely to destroy shareholder wealth than an opt-out rule. None of the studies cited by the Commission in its request for further comment support a competing conclusion. The studies cited by the Commission instead suggest a rational basis for the market’s concern that the proxy access process can be captured by a small number of institutions with idiosyncratic objectives that conflict with the best interests of the larger shareholder community.

Keywords: Proxy access, Securities and Exchange Commission, corporate governance, directors, boards, shareholder rights, shareholder voting, event study, stock price

JEL Classification: D72, D73, D78, G3, G38, K22, K23

Suggested Citation

Grundfest, Joseph, Measurement Issues in the Proxy Access Debate (January 18, 2010). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 71; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 392. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1538630 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1538630

Joseph A. Grundfest (Contact Author)

Stanford University Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0458 (Phone)
650-723-8229 (Fax)

Paper statistics

Downloads
259
Rank
98,159
Abstract Views
1,967