A New Necessary Condition For Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies

13 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2010

See all articles by Takashi Kunimoto

Takashi Kunimoto

Brown University - Department of Economics

Roberto Serrano

Brown University

Date Written: January 19, 2010

Abstract

Implementation in iteratively undominated strategies relies on permissive conditions. However, for the sufficiency results available, authors have relied on assumptions that amount to quasilinear preferences on a numeraire. We uncover a new necessary condition that implies that such assumptions cannot be dispensed with. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation are more restrictive than previously thought.

Keywords: mechanism design, exact and approximate implementation, iteratively

JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Kunimoto, Takashi and Serrano, Roberto, A New Necessary Condition For Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies (January 19, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1539048 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1539048

Takashi Kunimoto (Contact Author)

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

64 Waterman Street
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United States
401-863-2735 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

Roberto Serrano

Brown University ( email )

64 Waterman Street
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-1036 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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