Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540137
 
 

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Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab? Evidence from the Trust Game


Nicole M. Baran


Cornell University - Department of Psychology

Paola Sapienza


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 21, 2010

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-02

Abstract:     
We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

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Date posted: January 23, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Baran, Nicole M. and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi, Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab? Evidence from the Trust Game (January 21, 2010). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1540137

Contact Information

Nicole M. Baran
Cornell University - Department of Psychology ( email )
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
HOME PAGE: http://psych.cornell.edu/people/Graduate_Students/nmb68.html
Paola Sapienza
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-7436 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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