Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab? Evidence from the Trust Game

47 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2010

See all articles by Nicole M. Baran

Nicole M. Baran

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 21, 2010

Abstract

We show that a measure of reciprocity derived from the Berg et al. (1995) trust game in a laboratory setting predicts the reciprocal behavior of the same subjects in a real-world situation. By using the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) social desirability scale, we do not find any evidence that a desire to conform to social norms distorts results in the lab, yet we do find evidence that it affects results in the field.

Suggested Citation

Baran, Nicole M. and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi, Can We Infer Social Preferences from the Lab? Evidence from the Trust Game (January 21, 2010). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 10-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540137 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1540137

Nicole M. Baran

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )

Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-7436 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luigi Zingales (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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