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Collective Delegation and World Bank Aid Allocation

17 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2010  

A. Bradley Potter

College of William and Mary

Christopher O'Keefe

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: May 29, 2009

Abstract

Most studies of multilateral foreign aid allocation assume that only the United States, or, in the case of regional institutions where the US has no role, some regional great power has de facto control over the institution. Although it may well be the case, it has seldom been tested against the alternative: the institutionalized governance structures matter in a way that allow the preferences of multiple states to matter. As most multilateral aid allocation decisions occur as a matter of collective delegation, we correct this misspecification by exploring how the distribution of votes – both in raw form and in a priori power indexes – affects aid allocation. We use a non-equivalent dependent variables design with pattern-matching and non-equivalent groups to test how variance in the distribution of votes across the multilateral development banks influences several dimensions of foreign aid.

Suggested Citation

Potter, A. Bradley and O'Keefe, Christopher, Collective Delegation and World Bank Aid Allocation (May 29, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1540230

A. Bradley Potter

College of William and Mary ( email )

P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23185
United States

Christopher O'Keefe (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

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