Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism

American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 967-986, December 1979

21 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2010 Last revised: 25 Mar 2016

See all articles by Ruth Berins Collier

Ruth Berins Collier

University of California, Berkeley

David Collier

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 1979

Abstract

The concept of "corporatism" has usefully called attention to the importance of systems of interest representation based on non-competing groups that are officially sanctioned, subsidized, and supervised by the state. Yet these patterns have appeared in such a remarkable variety of political contexts that this concept may be too broad to be useful. On the basis of an analysis of the relationship between the state and organized labor in Latin America, this article argues that the concept of corporation can be disaggregated so that it sheds light on rather than obscures the different power relationships and political contexts with which it is associated. The analysis focuses on the distinction between "inducements" extended by the state to win the cooperation of groups and "constraints" through which the state directly controls groups. This disagreggated approach enables one to distinguish more subtly among systems of group representation, to conceive of state-group relations in more interactive terms, and to gain insights into the larger political context.

Suggested Citation

Collier, Ruth Berins and Collier, David, Inducements Versus Constraints: Disaggregating Corporatism (1979). American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 967-986, December 1979. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1540903

Ruth Berins Collier

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

David Collier (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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