Of Vulnerable Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases

39 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2010 Last revised: 18 Jan 2014

Date Written: 2010


Some courts appear to have begun to revise the standard for granting class certification, including in antitrust cases. The new standard, if there is one, may empower courts to find facts relevant to the merits in a way that historically they have not been permitted to do. If courts are ratcheting up the standard at class certification by forcing plaintiffs to make a showing on the merits, then it seems an unfortunate development for various reasons. First, the rationale for the change is unsubstantiated and implausible. Neither theory nor evidence supports the claim that corporations settle meritless class actions with any frequency, particularly in antitrust. Second, a heightened certification standard fits poorly in the existing procedural framework, potentially forcing a decision on the merits prematurely and possibly violating the Seventh Amendment. Third, such a standard may distort other aspects of the class certification decision. In particular, it may encourage courts to put undue emphasis on methods of proving class-wide injury, or “common impact,” at class certification. Fourth, the new standard would involve a back-door change to the procedural rules. Rule 23 does not contemplate that judges will rule on merits issues at class certification. If some modification of the class certification process is in order - if a procedural decision is going to morph into a merits determination - courts should follow the right method of effecting that change, including careful deliberation, empirical study, and a formal amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Keywords: antitrust, class actions, class certification, federal rules of civil procedure

Suggested Citation

Davis, Josh Paul and Cramer, Eric L., Of Vulnerable Monopolists?: Questionable Innovation in the Standard for Class Certification in Antitrust Cases (2010). Rutgers Law Journal, Forthcoming, Lawyers, Drugs & Money Symposium, Lawyers, Drugs & Money: A Prescription for Antitrust Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2011-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542143

Josh Paul Davis (Contact Author)

UC Law, San Francisco ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

HOME PAGE: http://uclawsf.edu

Eric L. Cramer

Berger Montague PC ( email )

1818 Market Street
Suite 3600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
United States
215.875.3009 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics