Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 153-173, 2010

Posted: 27 Jan 2010

See all articles by Alan Gerber

Alan Gerber

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Gregory Huber

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

Previous research shows that partisans rate the economy more favorably when their party holds power. There are several explanations for this association, including use of different evaluative criteria, selective perception, selective exposure to information, correlations between economic experiences and partisanship, and partisan bias in survey responses. We use a panel survey around the November 2006 election to measure changes in economic expectations and behavioral intentions after an unanticipated shift in political power.Using this design, we can observe whether the association between partisanship and economic assessments holds when some leading mechanisms thought to bring it about are excluded.We find that there are large and statistically significant partisan differences in how economic assessments and behavioral intentions are revised immediately following the Democratic takeover of Congress. We conclude that this pattern of partisan response suggests partisan differences in perceptions of the economic competence of the parties, rather than alternative mechanisms.

Keywords: Partisanship, economic assessment, economic behavior

JEL Classification: C90

Suggested Citation

Gerber, Alan and Huber, Gregory, Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments (2010). American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 153-173, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542872

Alan Gerber (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5232 (Phone)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Gregory Huber

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
455
PlumX Metrics