Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies

Posted: 27 Jan 2010

See all articles by Jack Robles

Jack Robles

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka - School of Economics & Finance

Date Written: 1997

Abstract

This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford ( Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-144). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided.

Keywords: Evolution, Dynamic, Class coordination games, Population, Strategy profile, Long run equilibria

JEL Classification: C70, C71, C73

Suggested Citation

Robles, Jack, Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies (1997). Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542936

Jack Robles (Contact Author)

Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka - School of Economics & Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 600
Wellington 6001
New Zealand

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