The Effects of Party Campaign Spending Under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Germany

46 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2010 Last revised: 14 Jun 2012

Alexander Fink

University of Leipzig

Date Written: May 15, 2012

Abstract

Most of the literature investigating the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes focuses on individual candidates in majoritarian systems. This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of party campaign spending on party vote shares under systems of proportional representation. German data are used to test several hypotheses derived from a simple election contest model. The results are mixed and only partially support the hypothesis of a positive effect of campaign spending on a party’s vote share.

Keywords: Proportional representation, campaign spending, election contest model, Germany

JEL Classification: D72, H0, P16

Suggested Citation

Fink, Alexander, The Effects of Party Campaign Spending Under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Germany (May 15, 2012). European Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1543898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1543898

Alexander Fink (Contact Author)

University of Leipzig ( email )

Grimmaische Str. 12
Leipzig, 04109

HOME PAGE: http://www.alexander-fink.com

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