Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment

25 Pages Posted: 1 Feb 2010  

Catia Batista

Faculdade de Economia - Universidade Nova de Lisboa; CReAM; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; NOVAFRICA

Pedro C. Vicente

New University of Lisbon - Nova School of Business and Economics

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Abstract

This paper tests the hypothesis that international migration experiences may promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability. In order to examine this question, we use a simple postcard voting experiment designed to capture the populationメs desire for better governance. Using data from a tailored household survey, we examine the determinants of voting behavior in our experiment, and isolate the positive effect of international emigration on the demand for political accountability. We find that this effect can be mainly attributed to the presence of return migrants, particularly to those who emigrated to countries with better governance.

Keywords: international migration, governance, political accountability, institutions, effects of emigration in origin countries, household survey, Cape Verde, Sub-Saharan Africa

JEL Classification: F22, O12, O15, O43, P16

Suggested Citation

Batista, Catia and Vicente, Pedro C., Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4688. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1545115

Catia Batista (Contact Author)

Faculdade de Economia - Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal

CReAM

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.iza.org/

NOVAFRICA ( email )

Faculdade de Economia - Universidade Nova Lisboa
Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal

HOME PAGE: http://www.novafrica.org

Pedro C. Vicente

New University of Lisbon - Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal

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