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The Welfare Effects of Use-or-Lose Provisions in Markets with Dominant Firms

U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 299

Posted: 4 Feb 2010  

Daniel P. O'Brien

Bates White Economic Consulting

Ian L. Gale

Georgetown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 1, 2010

Abstract

A use-or-lose provision requires firms to employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline, natural gas transmission, and electric power industries, among others. The primary objective of these provisions is to limit capacity hoarding. We examine the welfare implications of imposing a use-or-lose provision on firms that are able to buy and sell capacity. We find that imposing such a constraint makes it more likely that a dominant firm will purchase capacity from a competitive fringe. Moreover, imposing the constraint makes aggregate output fall if the dominant firm is more efficient than the fringe. If the dominant firm is less efficient than the fringe, aggregate output rises. In both cases, total surplus can rise or fall.

Keywords: Dominant firm, use-or-lose provision, acquisition, merger, divestiture

JEL Classification: D01, D43, D61, L13, L41

Suggested Citation

O'Brien, Daniel P. and Gale, Ian L., The Welfare Effects of Use-or-Lose Provisions in Markets with Dominant Firms (February 1, 2010). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 299. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1546457

Daniel P. O'Brien (Contact Author)

Bates White Economic Consulting ( email )

1300 I Street NW
Washington, DC 20005
United States

Ian L. Gale

Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
(202) 687-5732 (Phone)

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