New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market

CEPR Working Paper No. 2053

Posted: 2 Jul 1999

See all articles by Dale T. Mortensen

Dale T. Mortensen

Northwestern University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Christopher A. Pissarides

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST)

Date Written: January 1999

Abstract

This paper surveys recent work in equilibrium models of labor markets characterized by search and recruitment frictions and by the need to reallocate workers across productive activities. The duration of unemployment and jobs and wage determination are treated as endogenous outcomes of job creation and job destruction decisions made by workers and firms. The solutions studied are dynamic stochastic equilibria in the sense that time and uncertainty are explicitly modeled, expectations are rational, private gains from trade are exploited and the actions taken by all agents are mutually consistent. A number of alternative wage determination mechanisms are explored, including the frequently studied non-cooperative wage bargaining and wage posting by firms. We use the framework to study the influence of alternative labor market institutions and policies on wages and unemployment.

JEL Classification: D58, E24, J31, J41, J64

Suggested Citation

Mortensen, Dale T. and Pissarides, Christopher, New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor Market (January 1999). CEPR Working Paper No. 2053, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=154685

Dale T. Mortensen (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-8230 (Phone)
847-491-7001 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Christopher Pissarides

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 7513 (Phone)
+44 20 7831 1840 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) ( email )

Clearwater Bay
Kowloon, 999999
Hong Kong

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