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Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America

Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No. 110

41 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2010  

Fabiana V. P. Machado

Inter-American Development Bank

Carlos Scartascini

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 30, 2009

Abstract

This paper argues that where institutions are strong, actors are more likely to participate in the political process through institutionalized arenas, while where they are weak, protests and other unconventional means of participation become more appealing. This relationship is explored empirically by combining country-level measures of institutional strength with individual-level information on protest participation in 17 Latin American countries. Evidence is found that weaker political institutions are associated with a higher propensity to use alternative means for expressing preferences, that is, to protest. Also found are interesting interactions between country-level institutional strength and some individual-level determinants of participation in protests.

Keywords: Political Institutions, Public Policies, Institutional Strength, Protests, Alternative Political Technologies, Political Party Representation, Ideology, Ideological Extremism, Latin America

JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, H89, K42

Suggested Citation

Machado, Fabiana V. P. and Scartascini, Carlos and Tommasi, Mariano, Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America (November 30, 2009). Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No. 110. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1548961 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1548961

Fabiana V. P. Machado

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Carlos G. Scartascini (Contact Author)

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
2026231963 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cscartascini.org

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

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