Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work?

Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper No. 645

48 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2010

See all articles by Carlos Scartascini

Carlos Scartascini

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Ernesto Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

Veto player theory argues that a higher number of veto players lowers the likelihood of change; in turn, policies that do not change help to sustain commitments but may prevent adaptation to changing circumstances. This paper challenges that claim of veto player theory by arguing that policy stability does not necessarily mean lower policy adaptability. If policymaking takes place over time with actors interacting repeatedly, more cooperative polities might be able to achieve both objectives at once, and a higher number of veto players might even favor intertemporal cooperation. The paper presents a simple formalization of the argument and some supportive cross-national empirical evidence.

Keywords: Veto Players, Policy Adaptability, Policy Stability, Intertemporal Cooperation

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Scartascini, Carlos G. and Stein, Ernesto Hugo and Tommasi, Mariano, Veto Players, Intertemporal Interactions and Policy Adaptability: How Do Political Institutions Work? (2008). Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper No. 645, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1548969 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1548969

Carlos G. Scartascini (Contact Author)

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
2026231963 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cscartascini.org

Ernesto Hugo Stein

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue, NW
Research Department
Washington, DC 20577
United States

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

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