The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not?

Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper No. 100

60 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2010

See all articles by Mariano Tommasi

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Carlos Scartascini

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 30, 2009

Abstract

This paper develops a framework for analyzing different policymaking styles, their causes and their consequences in Latin America, finding that lower institutionalization and greater use of alternative political technologies (APTs) are more likely the lower the cost of using these technologies, the higher the potential damage they can cause, the lower the wealth of the economy, and the more asymmetric the distribution of de jure political power. Moreover, strategic complementarity exists in the use of alternative political technologies; for instance "bribes by the rich" and "protests by the poor" are likely to be countervailing forces, and will both occur in polities with weaker political institutions.

Keywords: Political Institutions, Public Policies, Institutional Strength, Protests, Alternative Political Technologies, Development, Judicial Independence, Party Institutionalization, Congress Capabilities, Cabinet Stability, Corruption

JEL Classification: D72, D74, D78, H89, K42

Suggested Citation

Tommasi, Mariano and Scartascini, Carlos G., The Making of Policy: Institutionalized or Not? (November 30, 2009). Inter-American Development Bank Research Department Working Paper No. 100, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1549003 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1549003

Mariano Tommasi

Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics ( email )

Vito Dumas 284
Victoria, Buenos Aires B1644BID
Argentina
+5411-4725-7020 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.udesa.edu.ar/tommasi/index.htm

Carlos G. Scartascini (Contact Author)

Research Department - Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ( email )

1300 New York Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
2026231963 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cscartascini.org

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