57 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2010
We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often consistent by being a best reply to first order beliefs. We identify the complexity of a game and the payoffs in equilibrium as determining the likelihood of consistent behavior according to textbook rationality. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals.
Keywords: strategic sophistication, beliefs, experiment, team decision making, individual decision making
JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sutter, Matthias and Czermak, Simon and Feri, Francesco, Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games. IZA Discussion Paper No. 4732. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1549208