Is Family Business Beautiful? Evidence from Italian Stock Market

36 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2010 Last revised: 9 Sep 2010

See all articles by Daniela Venanzi

Daniela Venanzi

Roma Tre University - Department of Economics

Ottorino Morresi

Department of Economics, University of Rome "Roma Tre"

Date Written: February 8, 2010

Abstract

From the agency perspective, literature studying links between investor protection and governance profiles argues that family is more disposed than other shareholders to divert private benefits in countries with a poor legal framework: the question is empirically puzzling. From the stewardship perspective, the degree of familiness affects the stewardship attitude of the firm. We do not find that family firms perform worse or better than non-family counterparts. Some evidence is found as regards the entrenchment effect: family CEOs seem to weaken firm performance. Stewardship attitude – not familiness – does matter: moderate levels of stewardship improve performance and increase risk-taking.

Keywords: Family business, agency theory, stewardship theory, performance, Italian listed firms

JEL Classification: G32, G34, L25, L26, M14

Suggested Citation

Venanzi, Daniela and Morresi, Ottorino, Is Family Business Beautiful? Evidence from Italian Stock Market (February 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1549535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1549535

Daniela Venanzi

Roma Tre University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Silvio d'Amico 77
Rome, Rome 00145
Italy

Ottorino Morresi (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Rome "Roma Tre" ( email )

Via Silvio D'amico, 77
Rome, Rome 00145
Italy
(+39) 0657335753 (Phone)

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