Strategic Behavior in IEAs: When and Why Countries Joined the Kyoto Protocol

31 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2010 Last revised: 1 Nov 2013

Christian Almer

University of Bath - Department of Economics

Ralph Winkler

University of Bern - Department of Economics; University of Bern - Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research

Date Written: September 1, 2011

Abstract

We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification that predicts strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and allows us to relate countries’ signing and ratification decisions. Analyzing the signature and ratification process of the Kyoto Protocol via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.

Keywords: Climate Change, Generalized Response Models, International Environmental Agreements, Kyoto Protocol

JEL Classification: Q54, F53, C25

Suggested Citation

Almer, Christian and Winkler, Ralph, Strategic Behavior in IEAs: When and Why Countries Joined the Kyoto Protocol (September 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1549612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1549612

Christian Almer (Contact Author)

University of Bath - Department of Economics ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath, BA2 7AY
United Kingdom

Ralph Winkler

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, 3001
Switzerland
+41 31 631 4508 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ralph-winkler.de

University of Bern - Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research ( email )

Zähringerstrasse 25
Bern, 3012
Switzerland

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