Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organizations

36 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2010

See all articles by Peter G. Klein

Peter G. Klein

Baylor University - Hankamer School of Business; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Strategy and Management; Ludwig von Mises Institute

Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois

Anita M. McGahan

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Christos N. Pitelis

Brunel University London

Date Written: February 9, 2010

Abstract

States, state agencies, multilateral agencies, and other non-market actors are relatively under-studied in strategic management and organization science. While important contributions to the study of public actors have been made within the agency-theoretic and transaction-cost traditions, there is little research in political economy that builds on resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches to the firm. Yet public organizations can be characterized as stocks of human and non-human resources, including routines and capabilities; they can possess excess capacity in these resources; and they may grow and diversify in predictable patterns according to behavioral and Penrosean logic. This paper shows how resource-based, dynamic capabilities, and behavioral approaches to understanding public agencies and organizations shed light on their nature and governance.

Keywords: Resource-based view, dynamic capabilities, behavioral view, public organizations

JEL Classification: L21, L22, L33, H11

Suggested Citation

Klein, Peter G. and Mahoney, Joseph T. and McGahan, Anita M. and Pitelis, Christos N., Resources, Capabilities, and Routines in Public Organizations (February 9, 2010). Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 1550028; Atlanta Competitive Advantage Conference 2010 Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550028 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1550028

Peter G. Klein (Contact Author)

Baylor University - Hankamer School of Business ( email )

Waco, TX 76798
United States
254-710-4903 (Phone)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Strategy and Management ( email )

Breiviksveien 40
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

Ludwig von Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
United States

Joseph T. Mahoney

University of Illinois ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
339 Commerce West
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
217-244-7969 (Phone)
217-244-4102 (Fax)

Anita M. McGahan

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
416-978-6188 (Phone)

Christos N. Pitelis

Brunel University London ( email )

Brunel Business School
Uxbridge
London, UB8 3PH
United Kingdom

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