Selected Aspects of Executive Remuneration in Listed Firms: Family vs. Non-Family Firms (Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung in Börsennotierten Unternehmen: Familien- vs. Nicht-Familienunternehmen)

Zeitschrift für Corporate Governance, No. 3, 2010

12 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2010 Last revised: 17 Oct 2010

See all articles by Ann‐Kristin Achleitner

Ann‐Kristin Achleitner

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Marc Steffen Rapp

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics; University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE)

Philipp Schaller

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen

Date Written: February 9, 2010

Abstract

There is an ongoing public debate about executive remuneration in listed firms. Specifically, in the course of the financial crises executive remuneration principles where claimed to be one of the driving forces for excessive risktaking and short-termism. Family firms, in contrast, are often considered to be committed to sustainable long-term strategies. We examine in which way executive remuneration policies of family firms differ from their counterparts in non-family firms. Examining German Prime Standard firms, we find that while there is no difference in the overall compensation level (when we control for firm size), family firms use less stock-based compensation vehicles but tie compensation of their executives closer to accounting based performance measures. Our results indicate that firms adopt individual compensation schemes and have important implications for regulators.

Note: Downloadable document is in German.

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Family Firms, Remuneration, Germany

Suggested Citation

Achleitner, Ann-Kristin and Rapp, Marc Steffen and Schaller, Philipp and Wolff, Michael, Selected Aspects of Executive Remuneration in Listed Firms: Family vs. Non-Family Firms (Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung in Börsennotierten Unternehmen: Familien- vs. Nicht-Familienunternehmen) (February 9, 2010). Zeitschrift für Corporate Governance, No. 3, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1550245

Ann-Kristin Achleitner

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, D-80290
Germany
+49 89 289 25181 (Phone)

Marc Steffen Rapp

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany

University of Marburg - Marburg Centre for Institutional Economics (MACIE) ( email )

Am Plan
Marburg, 35032
Germany

Philipp Schaller (Contact Author)

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, 80333
Germany
+49 (0)89 289 25440 (Phone)

Michael Wolff

University of Göttingen ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, DE 37073
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.contolling.uni-goettingen.de

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