Selected Aspects of Executive Remuneration in Listed Firms: Family vs. Non-Family Firms (Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung in Börsennotierten Unternehmen: Familien- vs. Nicht-Familienunternehmen)
Zeitschrift für Corporate Governance, No. 3, 2010
12 Pages Posted: 9 Feb 2010 Last revised: 17 Oct 2010
Date Written: February 9, 2010
There is an ongoing public debate about executive remuneration in listed firms. Specifically, in the course of the financial crises executive remuneration principles where claimed to be one of the driving forces for excessive risktaking and short-termism. Family firms, in contrast, are often considered to be committed to sustainable long-term strategies. We examine in which way executive remuneration policies of family firms differ from their counterparts in non-family firms. Examining German Prime Standard firms, we find that while there is no difference in the overall compensation level (when we control for firm size), family firms use less stock-based compensation vehicles but tie compensation of their executives closer to accounting based performance measures. Our results indicate that firms adopt individual compensation schemes and have important implications for regulators.
Note: Downloadable document is in German.
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Family Firms, Remuneration, Germany
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